Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction

Contents:

Author Info

  • Rabah Amir

    (University of Copenhagen, Institute of Economics)

  • Niels Nannerup

    (University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics)

Abstract

This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game - open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent - on the equilibrium consumption path and the overall utility of the agents. The open-loop regime yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. The Markovian regime leads to the most pronounced version of the tragedy of the commons. History-dependent behavior yields an outcome set that is intermediate between the other two cases.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2000/0009.pdf/
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 00-09.

as in new window
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0009

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Dynamic resource games; Open-loop; Closed-loop and trigger strategies; Pareto optimality; Regulation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Perry, Martin K, 1984. "Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition, and Public Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 313-33, March.
  2. Lewis, Tracy R. & Schmalensee, Richard., 1979. "On oligopolistic markets for nonrenewable natural resources," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management 1052-79., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  3. Easley, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1981. "Stochastic Equilibrium and Optimality with Rolling Plans," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(1), pages 79-103, February.
  4. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Kaitala, Veijo, 1989. "On efficient equilibrium solutions in dynamic games of resource management," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 23-34, March.
  5. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1982. "On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 194-201, March.
  6. Salant, Stephen W, 1976. "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 1079-93, October.
  7. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 111-131, August.
  8. Manjira Datta & Leonard Mirman, . "Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction," Working Papers, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University 2132842, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  9. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
  10. Dasgupta,P. S. & Heal,G. M., 1985. "Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521297615.
  11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  12. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
  13. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
  14. Jonathan Cave, 1987. "Long-Term Competition in a Dynamic Game: The Cold Fish War," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(4), pages 596-610, Winter.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. AMIR, Rabah, 2001. "Stochastic games in economics and related fields: an overview," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2001060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.