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Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction

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Author Info
Rabah Amir (University of Copenhagen, Institute of Economics)
Niels Nannerup (University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics)

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Abstract

This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game - open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent - on the equilibrium consumption path and the overall utility of the agents. The open-loop regime yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. The Markovian regime leads to the most pronounced version of the tragedy of the commons. History-dependent behavior yields an outcome set that is intermediate between the other two cases.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 00-09.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0009

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Related research
Keywords: Dynamic resource games; Open-loop; Closed-loop and trigger strategies; Pareto optimality; Regulation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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  1. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Kaitala, Veijo, 1989. "On efficient equilibrium solutions in dynamic games of resource management," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 23-34, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 111-131, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lewis, Tracy R & Schmalensee, Richard, 1980. "On Oligopolistic Markets for Nonrenewable Natural Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 475-91, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Salant, Stephen W, 1976. "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 1079-93, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ted Bergstrom, 1982. "On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1982A, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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  6. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jonathan Cave, 1987. "Long-Term Competition in a Dynamic Game: The Cold Fish War," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(4), pages 596-610, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Chiarella, Carl, et al, 1984. "On the Economics of International Fisheries," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 85-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Datta, Manjira & Mirman, Leonard J., 1999. "Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 233-255, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Perry, Martin K, 1984. "Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition, and Public Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 313-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Easley, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1981. "Stochastic Equilibrium and Optimality with Rolling Plans," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(1), pages 79-103, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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