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Fishery Economics and Game Theory

Author

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  • Lone Grønbæk

    (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)

Abstract

Game theory is an analytical tool for modeling strategic interaction between agents. Strategic interaction in fishery is interpreted as the harvest by one agent highly affects other agents’ decision. This paper is a commented literature study on the fishery economics and game theory. It tends to describe how fishery models using game theory are build up. These models consist of an underlying biological models and the game-theoretical computational concepts. The paper then describes different types of fishery and how these types are related to game theory. Special features as externalities and irreversib le capital are discussed. The paper then presents two classic models of fishery economics using game theory. Two newer papers using game theory are discussed. Finally, the paper concludes with ideas for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Lone Grønbæk, 2000. "Fishery Economics and Game Theory," Working Papers 14/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:14
    as

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    File URL: http://www.sdu.dk/~/media/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Miljo/ime/wp/Gronbk14.ashx
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July.
    3. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    4. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
    5. Sumaila, Ussif Rashid, 1999. "A review of game-theoretic models of fishing," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-10, January.
    6. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
    7. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-653, August.
    8. Borch, Karl, 1962. "Application of Game Theory to Some Problems in Automobile Insurance*)," ASTIN Bulletin, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 208-221, September.
    9. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
    10. Gordon R. Munro, 1979. "The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(3), pages 355-376, August.
    11. Martin Shubik, 1962. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 325-343, April.
    12. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    13. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
    14. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    15. Smith, Vernon L, 1969. "On Models of Commercial Fishing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(2), pages 181-198, March/Apr.
    16. James A. Brander & M. Scott Taylor, 1997. "International Trade and Open-Access Renewable Resources: The Small Open Economy Case," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 526-552, August.
    17. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    18. Clark, Colin W. & Munro, Gordon R., 1975. "The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 92-106, December.
    19. Dale Squires, 1987. "Public Regulation and the Structure of Production in Multiproduct Industries: An Application to the New England Otter Trawl Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 232-247, Summer.
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