Property rights with biological spillovers: when Hardin meets Meade
AbstractIn an overlapping generations setup we address the issue of the optimal number of property rights to allocate over a natural resource when the goal is to maximize the stock of the natural resource at the steady state. We assume that the effect of the property rights regime on the evolution of the resource is twofold: through biological spillovers and through monitoring costs. Property rights are assigned to local communities, which can decide whether to cooperate or not. The outcome in the strategic setting is hence compared to the one in the cooperative setup. A fiscal policy able to decentralize the cooperative outcome is studied.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2010071.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2010
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overlapping generations; resource management; common pool resource; spatial interdependence; strategic behaviour; cooperative behaviour;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2011-02-12 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-ENV-2011-02-12 (Environmental Economics)
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