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Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction

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This paper analyzes the effect of market power in a model with dynamic and biological externalities. When several countries harvest fish in international waters the evolution of fish population is affected by their joint action, thus, generating a biological and a dynamic externality. If there is trade in fish, the market-clearing prices depend on the harvesting and consumption decision made in every country. Therefore, market-clearing prices generate another type of interdependence. The planners' make their policy decision by taking account of various externalities.We find a subgame perfect Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the conditions under which it may be efficient. We also study the role of different externalities in generating inefficiency.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University in its series Working Papers with number 2132842.

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Handle: RePEc:asu:wpaper:2132842

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  1. Datta, Manjira, 1997. "Externalities and Price Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(3), pages 587-603, August.
  2. Manjira Datta & Leonard J. Mirman, . "Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination," Working Papers 97/11, Arizona State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Karp, Larry, 1992. "Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 353-72, May.
  4. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1992. "Strategic dynamic interaction : Fish wars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 267-287, April.
  5. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
  6. Brander, James A. & Scott Taylor, M., 1998. "Open access renewable resources: Trade and trade policy in a two-country model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 181-209, April.
  7. Copeland, Brian R., 1990. "Strategic enhancement and destruction of fisheries and the environment in the presence of international externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 213-226, November.
  8. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
  9. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-73, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé, . "Sample-Path Stability of Non-Stationary Dynamic Economic Systems," IEW - Working Papers 046, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. Do, Kim Hang Pham & Folmer, Henk, 2004. "Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form," 2004 Conference, June 25-26, 2004, Blenheim, New Zealand 97792, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  3. Mirman, Leonard J. & To, Ted, 2005. "Strategic resource extraction, capital accumulation and overlapping generations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 378-386, September.
  4. Bischi, Gian Italo & Lamantia, Fabio, 2007. "Harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 348-370, March.
  5. Rabah Amir & Niels Nannerup, 2006. "Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 147-165, August.
  6. Eppink, Florian V. & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2007. "Ecological theories and indicators in economic models of biodiversity loss and conservation: A critical review," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2-3), pages 284-293, March.
  7. Wang, Wen-Kai & Ewald, Christian-Oliver, 2010. "A stochastic differential Fishery game for a two species fish population with ecological interaction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 844-857, May.
  8. Carlotta Balestra & Thierry Bréchet & Stéphane Lambrecht, 2012. "Property rights with biological spillovers : when Hardin meets Meade," Working Papers hal-00989828, HAL.
  9. Pham Do, K.H. & Folmer, H., 2003. "International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation," Discussion Paper 2003-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Manjira Datta & Leonard Mirman & Olivier Morand & Kevin Reffett, . "Lattice Methods in Computation of Sequential Markov Equilibrium in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 2179545, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  11. Andrzej Nowak, 2006. "A note on an equilibrium in the great fish war game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(2), pages 1-10.
  12. Haavio, M., 2001. "Transboundary Pollution and Household Mobility: Are They Equivalent?," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 500, Department of Economics.
  13. Sandal, Leif K. & Steinshamn, Stein I., 2004. "Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1781-1799, July.
  14. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.

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