A note on an equilibrium in the great fish war game
AbstractThe great fish war game by Levhari and Mirman is studied under the limiting average utility criterion. It turns out that a stationary equilibrium in this game has a turnpike property, leads to higher steady state compared with those of discounted games but gives a higher steady state consumption. The convergence of the equilibrium functions in the finite horizon games to an equilibrium function in the infinite horizon discounted game is also proved.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 17 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Dynamic resource extraction game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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