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A note on an equilibrium in the great fish war game

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  • Andrzej Nowak

    ()
    (Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Science and Econometrics, University of Zielona Gora)

Abstract

The great fish war game by Levhari and Mirman is studied under the limiting average utility criterion. It turns out that a stationary equilibrium in this game has a turnpike property, leads to higher steady state compared with those of discounted games but gives a higher steady state consumption. The convergence of the equilibrium functions in the finite horizon games to an equilibrium function in the infinite horizon discounted game is also proved.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2006/Volume17/EB-05Q20009A.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 17 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 1-10

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05q20009

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Related research

Keywords: Dynamic resource extraction game;

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References

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  1. Datta, Manjira & Mirman, Leonard J., 1999. "Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 233-255, May.
  2. Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1989. "Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 153-177, February.
  3. Dutta, Prajit K & Sundaram, Rangarajan K, 1993. "The Tragedy of the Commons?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 413-26, July.
  4. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1992. "Strategic dynamic interaction : Fish wars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 267-287, April.
  5. Nowak, Andrzej S., 2006. "A multigenerational dynamic game of resource extraction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 327-336, May.
  6. Andrzej Nowak, 2006. "On perfect equilibria in stochastic models of growth with intergenerational altruism," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 73-83, 05.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Elena Denisova & Andrey Garnaev, 2008. "Fish Wars: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Approaches," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 028-040, March.
  2. Andrzej Nowak, 2006. "Remarks on sensitive equilibria in stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 481-494, December.
  3. Breton, Michèle & Keoula, Michel Yevenunye, 2014. "A great fish war model with asymmetric players," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-223.

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