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Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games

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Sundaram, Rangarajan K.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 153-177
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:47:y:1989:i:1:p:153-177

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Kevin Reffett & Olivier Morand, . "On the Existence and Characterization of Markovian Equilibrium in Models with Simple Non-paternalistic Altruism," Working Papers 2133478, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kevin Reffett & Manjira Datta & Leonard Mirman & Olivier Morand, . "Monotone Methods for Markovian Equilibrium in Dynamic Economies," Working Papers 2133476, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Manjira Datta & Leonard Mirman & Olivier Morand & Kevin Reffett, . "Lattice Methods in Computation of Sequential Markov Equilibrium in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 2179545, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mariana Conte Grand, 1998. "Environmental Agreements in a Two-Level Dynamic Framework," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 130, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Andrzej Nowak, 2006. "A note on an equilibrium in the great fish war game," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 17(2), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
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