Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction
AbstractThis paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game - open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent - on the equilibrium consumption path and the overall utility of the agents. The open-loop regime yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. The Markovian regime leads to the most pronounced version of the tragedy of the commons. History-dependent behavior yields an outcome set that is intermediate between the other two cases.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Bioeconomics.
Volume (Year): 8 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=103315
dynamic resource games; open and closed loop strategies; trigger strategies; Pareto optimality; regulation; Q20; C73; H41; Q22;
Other versions of this item:
- AMIR, Rabah & NANNERUP, Niels, 2004. "Information structure and the tragedy of the commons in resource extraction," CORE Discussion Papers 2004040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Rabah Amir & Niels Nannerup, 2000. "Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction," Discussion Papers 00-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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