AbstractExisting models of open-access resources are applicable to non-storable resources, such as fish. Many open-access resources, however, are used to produce storable goods. Elephants, rhinos, and tigers are three prominent examples. Anticipated future scarcity of these resources will increase current prices, and current poaching. This implies that, for given initial conditions, there may be rational expectations equilibria leading both to extinction and to survival. Governments may be able to eliminate extinction equilibria by promising to implement tough anti-poaching measures if the population falls below a threshold. Alternatively, they, or private agents, may be able to eliminate extinction equilibria by accumulating a sufficient stockpile of the storable good.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5674.
Date of creation: Jul 1996
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Publication status: published as Kremer, Michael and Charles Morcom. "Elephants," American Economic Review, 2000, v90(1,Mar), 212-234.
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Other versions of this item:
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - General
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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- Haurie, Alain & Pohjola, Matti, 1987. "Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 65-78, March.
- Bergstrom, Ted, 1990. "On the Economics of Crime and Confiscation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 171-78, Summer.
- Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December.
- Charles Morcom & Michael Kremer, 2000. "Elephants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 212-234, March.
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