The Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: A Dynamic Approach
AbstractThe authors consider a common-property resource sold in imperfectly competitive markets. There is a dynamic externality (current harvests lower future stocks, raising future harvest costs) and a static (crowding) externality. Increasing industry size raises costs but lowers prices; thus, it has ambiguous welfare effects. The optimal industry size typically changes over time, so that a first-best outcome cannot be obtained with a fixed number of firms. Single-firm exploitation is optimal only under special circumstances. The socially optimal open loop steady-state industry size corresponds to the static optimum; both generally differ from the closed-loop steady-state optimum.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 30 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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