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Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection

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  • Safarzynska, Karolina
  • van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M.

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of institutional change that builds upon a synthesis of theoretical insights from the literatures on group selection and socio-economic power. Based on a critical reading of relevant studies in sociology, political science and philosophy, we propose a taxonomy of power comprising different sources and mechanisms of exercising power. We discuss how these can be incorporated in a group selection framework to explain the evolution of environmental institutions and policies. This may improve our understanding of the feasibility, effectiveness and dynamics of the latter.

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  • Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2010. "Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 743-752, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:743-752
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