Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior
AbstractIn a broad psychological perspective, both economic incentives and social norms may be be regarded as giving rise to purposesful, or "rational" behavior. By this I simply mean that individuals act in accordaance with expected reward or punishment, even though the form these take differs substantially in the two cases. Whereas economic incentives imply "material rewards", or favors that can be traded for such rewards including leisure, social norms imply "social rewards".
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 87 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Other versions of this item:
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
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