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Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources

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  • Anastasios Xepapadeas

Abstract

The evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that in long-run equilibrium, coexistence of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules is possible under regulation. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics", 2005 .

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 107 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Pages: 583-599

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:107:y:2005:i:3:p:583-599

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  1. Devon Garvie & Andrew Keeler, 1993. "Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous Regulatory Choice," Working Papers 873, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. van Egteren, Henry & Weber, Marian, 1996. "Marketable Permits, Market Power, and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 161-173, March.
  3. Raakjær Nielsen, Jesper & Mathiesen, Christoph, 2003. "Important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries lessons from Denmark," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 409-416, September.
  4. Grieson, Ronald E. & Singh, Nirvikar, 1990. "Regulating externalities through testing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 369-387, April.
  5. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
  6. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
  7. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
  8. Smith, Vernon L, 1971. "Economics of Production from Natural Resources: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 488-91, June.
  9. Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
  10. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
  11. Laurent Franckx, 1998. "The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces9835, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  12. Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
  13. Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
  2. Constadina Passa & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2008. "Regulation of Farming Activities: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0811, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  3. Alessandro Tavoni & Maja Schlüter & Simon Levin, 2011. "The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management," Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers 35, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  4. Shahbaz, Muhammad & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Shabbir, Muhammad Shahbaz, 2012. "Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis in Pakistan: Cointegration and Granger causality," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 2947-2953.
  5. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Qazi Muhammad Adnan, Hye & Aviral Kumar, Tiwari, 2013. "Economic Growth, Energy Consumption, Financial Development, International Trade and CO2 Emissions, in Indonesia," MPRA Paper 43272, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2012.
  6. Muhammad, Shahbaz, 2012. "Multivariate granger causality between CO2 Emissions, energy intensity, financial development and economic growth: evidence from Portugal," MPRA Paper 37774, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Mar 2012.
  7. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Muhammad, Shahbaz Shabbir, 2011. "Environmental Kuznets Curve and the role of energy consumption in Pakistan," MPRA Paper 34929, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Nov 2011.
  8. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Faridul, Islam & Muhammad Sabihuddin, Butt, 2011. "Financial Development, Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions: Evidence from ARDL Approach for Pakistan," MPRA Paper 30138, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Apr 2011.
  9. Alessandro Tavoni & Maja Schlüter & Simon Levin, 2011. "The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37571, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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