This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Regulation of Farming Activities: An Evolutionary Approach

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Constadina Passa () (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)
Anastasios Xepapadeas () (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Farming activity is modeled under an intervention policy regime, combining the environmental requirements of the Council Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC) and the compensatory provisions of the second pillar of the Common Agricul- tural Policy. The optimizing behavioural rule along with the evolutionary rule is employed in order to model the individual farmer's decision making, regard- ing compliance or not with regulatory provisions. The impact of these di¤erent behavioral rules on the selection of monitoring effort and thus on the compli- ance incentives of a population of farmers is examined. Analysis indicated that if monitoring effort is chosen arbitrarily or optimally based on the accustomed full rationality assumption then the population adopts a monomorphic behav- ior in the long-run, involving either full or noncompliance with the Directive's provisions. A polymorphic behavior involving partial compliance of the pop- ulation also arises if the dynamic model of optimal monitoring is constrained by replicator dynamics which represent the imitation rules. It is evident, thus, that the number and the type of the equilibrium steady-states is affected by the assumption regarding the behavioral rule adopted by regulated agents. Fi- nally, the dynamics of the population of compliant farmers is also assessed under accumulation of monitoring capital indicating identical properties.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.soc.uoc.gr/econ/wpa/docs/Monitoring-Effort-Capital-10June.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Crete, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0811.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0811

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Gallos - Rethymno 74100
Phone: +30 831 77405
Fax: +30 831 77406
Web page: http://www.soc.uoc.gr/econ/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Kostis Pigounakis).

Related research
Keywords: Nitrates Directive agri-environmental programs monitoring effford monitoring capital rationality optimal behavioral rule replicator dynamics imitation

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1995. "Observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 485-498, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Underwood, Nora A. & Caputo, Michael R., 1996. "Environmental and Agricultural Policy Effects on Information Acquisition and Input Choice," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 198-218, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy, adjustment costs, and behavior of the firm," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 258-275, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fleming, R. A. & Adams, R. M., 1997. "The Importance of Site-Specific Information in the Design of Policies to Control Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 347-358, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Caputo, Michael R., 1990. "How to do comparative dynamics on the back of an envelope in optimal control theory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 655-683, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Langpap, Christian & Wu, JunJie, 2004. "Voluntary conservation of endangered species: when does no regulatory assurance mean no conservation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 435-457, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Murat Isik, 2004. "Incentives for Technology Adoption Under Environmental Policy Uncertainty: Implications for Green Payment Programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(3), pages 247-263, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 107(3), pages 583-599, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. LaFrance, Jeffrey T. & Barney, L. Dwayne, 1991. "The envelope theorem in dynamic optimization," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 355-385, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Feinstein, C. D. & Oren, S. S., 1983. "Local stability properties of the modified Hamiltonian dynamic system," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 387-397, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-27.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.