We investigate second-best, input-based taxes foragricultural nonpoint pollution control when marketprices are endogenous and production isheterogeneous. Theoretically, we derive the optimalforms of taxes which take account of heterogeneity(non-uniform taxes) and a tax which does not (auniform tax). Empirically, we use a multi-factor,market-equilibrium simulation model to determineoptimal tax rates and associated equity effects,particularly differences in landowner gains/lossesacross a heterogeneous region. When market prices areendogenous, second-best tax policies result inpecuniary externalities that affect existingenvironmental externalities. In particular, thepecuniary externalities amplify the effect of producerheterogeneity on determination of sub-regionaldifferences in tax rates and returns to land,particularly for the uniform policy. With endogenousprices, the uniform tax rate is considerably higherthan any of the non-uniform rates and, ironically, thenon-uniform taxes result in less dispersion oflandowner gains across sub-regions than the uniformtax. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: