This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ACC-2007-01-14 (Accounting & Auditing)
• NEP-ALL-2007-01-14 (All new papers)
• NEP-PBE-2007-01-14 (Public Economics)

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   • Erard, B. & Feinstein, J.S., 1993. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," Carleton Economic Papers 93-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
2. Joel Slemrod, 2004. "The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness," NBER Working Papers 10858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
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   • Graetz, Michael J. & Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., . "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Working Papers 589, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
4. Sanchez, Isabel & Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 345-369, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Isabel S‡nchez & Joel Sobel, 1991. "Hierarchical Design and Enforcement of Income Tax Policies," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 91-02, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
5. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. David E. A. Giles, & Patrick J. Caragata, 1999. "The Learning Path of the Hidden Economy: The Tax Burden and Tax Evasion in New Zealand," Econometrics Working Papers 9904, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Giles, David E A & Caragata, Patrick J, 2001. "The Learning Path of the Hidden Economy: The Tax Burden and Tax Evasion in New Zealand," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 33(14), pages 1857-67, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Poterba, James M, 1987. "Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 234-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • James M. Poterba, 1987. "Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation," NBER Working Papers 2119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • James M. Poterba, 1987. "Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation," Working papers 436, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
8. Wane, Waly, 2000. "Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2394, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
9. Josef Hofbauer & Karl H. Schlag, 2000. "Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 10(5), pages 523-543. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Hofbauer, Josef, and Karl H. Schlag, . "Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games," Discussion Paper Serie B 427, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1998. [Downloadable!]
10. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996. [Downloadable!]
    • Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
11. repec:att:wimass:199610 is not listed on IDEAS
12. Vasin Alexander & Vasina Polina, 2002. "Tax Optimization under Tax Evasion: The Role of Penalty Constraints," EERC Working Paper Series 01-09e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
13. Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998. "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1101-1117, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Bardsley, P., 1997. "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 548, The University of Melbourne.
15. Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & James R. Hines, Jr., 1999. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 6903, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Eduardo Engel & James R. Hines Jr., 1998. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 47, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
    • Eduardo Engel & James Hines, 2000. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1117, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

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1. Constadina Passa & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2008. "Regulation of Farming Activities: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0811, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Lipatov, Vilen, 2006. "Tax Evasion and Coordination," MPRA Paper 1251, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]