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Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics

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Author Info
Eduardo Engel (University of Chile)
James Hines (University of Michigan)

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Abstract

Americans who are caught evading taxes in one year may be audited for prior years. While the IRS does not disclose its method of selecting tax returns for audit, it is widely believed that a taxpayer's probability of being audited is an increasing function of current evasion. Under these circumstances, a rational taxpayer's current evasion is a decreasing function of prior evasion, since, if audited and caught evading this year, the taxpayer may incur penalties for past evasions. The paper presents a model that formalizes this notion, and derives its implications for the responsiveness of individual and aggregate tax evasion to changes in the economic environment. The aggregate behavior of American taxpayers over the 1947-1993 period is consistent with the implications of this model. Specifically, aggregate tax evasion is higher in years in which past evasions are small relative to current tax liabilities - which is the case when incomes or tax rates rise. Furthermore, aggregate audit-related fines and penalties imposed by the IRS are positively related not only to aggregate current-year evasion but also to evasion in prior years. The estimates imply that the average tax evasion rate in the United States over this period is 42% lower than it would be if taxpayers were unconcerned about retrospective audits.

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1117.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1117

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  5. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1994. " Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(2), pages 219-39.
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    Other versions:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2000. "Auditing with Signals," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0660, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 1999. "Auditing with Signals," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    • Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J David, 2002. "Auditing with Signals," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(273), pages 1-20, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Elöd Takáts & Tamás K. Papp, 2008. "Tax Rate Cuts and Tax Compliance--The Laffer Curve Revisited," IMF Working Papers 08/7, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-13, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ratbek Dzhumashev & Emin Gahramanov, 2008. "Can We Tax the Desire for Tax Evasion?," Economics Series 2008_19, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Anna Ivanova & Alexander Klemm & Michael Keen, 2005. "The Russian Flat Tax Reform," IMF Working Papers 05/16, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2004. "Illegal, Immoral, Fattening or What?: How Deterrence and Responsive Regulation Shape Tax Morale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200426, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  7. Jan Hanousek & Filip Palda, 2002. "The Evolution of Tax Evasion in the Czech Republic: A Markov Chain Analysis," Public Economics 0205002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kalina Koleva, 2005. "A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05050, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  9. Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
  10. Monica Keneley, 2004. "In the Service of the Society: Labour Management Practices in the Australian Life Insurance Industry to 1940," Economics Series 2004_19, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lipatov, Vilen, 2008. "Social Interaction in Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 8829, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Alejandro Esteller-More, 2004. "Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes," Public Economics 0401001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Bruno Frey & Lars Feld, 2002. "Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Simone Pellegrino & Massimiliano Piacenza & Gilberto Turati, 2008. "The Runaway Taxpayer or: Is Prior Tax Notice Effective against Scofflaws?," Working Papers 1, University of Torino, Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato". [Downloadable!]
  15. Dirk Niepelt, 2004. "Timing Tax Evasion," Working Papers 04.07, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Frank A Cowell, 2003. "Sticks and Carrots," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 68, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  17. Bruno Chiarini & Marco Di Domizio & Elisabetta Marzano, 2008. "Why do underground reducing policies often fail their scope? Some answers from the Italian experience," Working Papers 8_2008, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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