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A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience

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Author Info
Kalina Koleva () (MATISSE)
Abstract

Actual fiscal structures' functioning is greatly constrained by some distortions, such as efficiency costs, due to the coercitive nature of tax collection. The mainstream optimal taxation literature ignores, however, the incurring tax system costs. Given these costs and in presence of fiscal evasion and fiscal avoidance, the policy tools' efficiency is clearly diminished. Integrating fiscal avoidance and evasion into normative analysis of taxation means introducing a new set of policy instruments whose optimal setting is at issue. It also invites to consider the theory of " optimal tax systems ". In order to study these institutional and societal tax features a methodological reorientation is needed. The effective cost of taxation would be then more visible and thus easier to integrate into public economics topics. Subsequently, this investigation requires a new efficiency costs typology jointly with a revision of social welfare effects.

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File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2005/R05050.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number r05050.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2005
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Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r05050

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Related research
Keywords: Efficiency costs fiscal avoidance fiscal evasion optimal taxation.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-25.


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