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The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax

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Weiss, Laurence

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 84 (1976)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 1343-52
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:84:y:1976:i:6:p:1343-52

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