Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing
AbstractTax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Public Finance = Finances publiques.
Volume (Year): 51 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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- Anastasios Xepapadeas & Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos, . "On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents," DEOS Working Papers 1325, Athens University of Economics and Business.
- Fryer, Roland, 2009. "Implicit Quotas," Scholarly Articles 2940155, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jean-François Gautier, 2000. "L’informel est-il une forme de fraude fiscale ? Une analyse microéconométrique de la fraude fiscale des micro-entreprises à Madagascar," Working Papers DT/2000/07, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
- Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005.
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- James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lipatov, Vilen, 2008. "Social Interaction in Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 8829, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chongwoo Choe, 1995.
"Contract Design and Costly Verification Games,"
1995.18, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
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