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L’informel est-il une forme de fraude fiscale ? Une analyse microéconométrique de la fraude fiscale des micro-entreprises à Madagascar

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Author Info
Jean-François Gautier () (DIAL, Université Paris IX)
Abstract

Since de Soto’s work, the entrepreneur’s choice to enter or not the formal sector is usually compared to a tax evasion behaviour. This characterisation seems to be weakened by many recent surveys where it appears that fiscal rules are generally unknown by managers. This article tries to assess the accuracy of tax determinants on the formal-informal dualism. For that purpose a tax evasion model is build and then tested on data from a survey undertaken in Antananarivo. Our regressions show that the propensity of an enterprise to belong to the formal sector can be explained by fiscal variables. _________________________________ Selon les travaux de H de Soto, le choix d’un entrepreneur d’intégrer le secteur formel résulte de l’arbitrage entre les gains anticipés sur les deux secteurs formel/informel. Ce choix s’apparente à un comportement de fraude fiscale. En revanche, d’autres enquêtes font apparaître essentiellement une méconnaissance des obligations fiscales des entrepreneurs. Dans cet article, nous essayons de déterminer dans quelle mesure la fiscalité influence le dualisme formel-informel. Un modèle de fraude fiscale appliqué aux micro-entreprises et à la fiscalité malgache est construit, puis testé à partir des données de l’enquête sur le secteur informel à Antananarivo. Il ressort de nos régressions que la propension d’une entreprise à devenir formelle peut être expliquée de manière pertinente par un modèle de fraude fiscale.

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Paper provided by DIAL (Développement, Institutions & Analyses de Long terme) in its series Working Papers with number DT/2000/07.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt200007

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Related research
Keywords: Tax Evasion; Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models

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    Other versions:
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  16. repec:att:wimass:199610 is not listed on IDEAS
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