Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing
Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
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