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Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing

Author

Listed:
  • Bardsley, P.

Abstract

Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.

Suggested Citation

  • Bardsley, P., 1997. "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 548, The University of Melbourne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:548
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Diagne, Youssoupha S & Thiaw, Kalidou, 2008. "Fiscalité et secteur informel au Sénégal
      [Informal sector and tax compliance in Senegal]
      ," MPRA Paper 54867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Choe, Chongwoo, 1998. "Contract design and costly verification games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 327-340, February.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4929 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005.
    5. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2009. "An emission tax pollution control system with imperfect monitoring," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(1), pages 21-40, March.
    6. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., 2009. "Implicit Quotas," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-20, January.
    7. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Lipatov, Vilen, 2008. "Social Interaction in Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 8829, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Jean-François Gautier, 2000. "L’informel est-il une forme de fraude fiscale ? Une analyse microéconométrique de la fraude fiscale des micro-entreprises à Madagascar," Working Papers DT/2000/07, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
    10. Fryer, Roland, 2009. "Implicit Quotas," Scholarly Articles 2940155, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    11. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos, "undated". "On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents," DEOS Working Papers 1325, Athens University of Economics and Business.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    TAXES; TAXATION; GAMES; GAME THEORY;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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