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Implicit Quotas

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  • Fryer, Roland

Abstract

Employment or admission “goals†are often preferred to affirmative action as a way of obtaining diversity. By constructing a simple model of employer†auditor interaction, I show that when an auditor has imperfect information regarding employers’ proclivities to discriminate and the fraction of qualified minorities in each employer’s applicant pool, goals are synonymous with quotas. Technically speaking, any equilibrium of the auditing game involves a nonempty set of employers who hire so that they do not trigger an audit by rejecting qualified nonminorities, hiring unqualified minorities, or both. Further, under some assumptions, explicit quotas (those mandated by an auditor) are more efficient than implicit quotas (goals settled on in equilibrium by employers wishing to avoid an audit).

Suggested Citation

  • Fryer, Roland, 2009. "Implicit Quotas," Scholarly Articles 2940155, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:2940155
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fryer Roland & Jackson Matthew O., 2008. "A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-44, February.
    2. Roland G. Fryer Jr. & Glenn C. Loury, 2005. "Affirmative Action and Its Mythology," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 147-162, Summer.
    3. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1994. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    4. Lawarree, Jacques P. & Van Audenrode, Marc A., 1992. "Cost observation, auditing and limited liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 419-423, August.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    6. Roland G. Freyer, Jr. & Glenn C. Loury & Tolga Yuret, 2003. "Color Blind Affirmative Action," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-131, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    7. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    8. Bardsley, Peter, 1996. "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 51(4), pages 473-489.
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    Cited by:

    1. Blumkin, Tomer & Margalioth, Yoram & Sadka, Efraim, 2009. "Incorporating affirmative action into the welfare state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1027-1035, October.
    2. , Emin & , Bumin & , Ali, 2013. "Effective affirmative action in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.

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