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On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents

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  • Anastasios Xepapadeas
  • Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos

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  • Anastasios Xepapadeas & Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos, 2013. "On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents," DEOS Working Papers 1325, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:aue:wpaper:1325
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    File URL: http://wpa.deos.aueb.gr/docs/Tax.Evading.Agents.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kong-Pin & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control versus External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 151-164, Spring.
    2. Greenberg, Joseph, 1984. "Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-13, February.
    3. Slemrod, Joel B, 1985. "An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 67(2), pages 232-238, May.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Bardsley, Peter, 1996. "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 51(4), pages 473-489.
    6. Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005.
    7. Wane, Waly, 2000. "Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2394, The World Bank.
    8. Kong-Pin Chen & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control vs. External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 151-164, Winter.
    9. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    10. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    11. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    12. Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692198, December.
    13. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-760, October.
    14. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
    15. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    16. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
    17. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax Evasion; Replicator Dynamics; Optimization; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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