Tax Compliance games with Imperfect Auditing
AbstractTax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 1994.22.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Taxes; Economic Theory EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau;
Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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- repec:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/4929 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gautier, Jean-François, 2001. "L’informel est-il une forme de fraude fiscale ? Une analyse micro-économétrique de la fraude fiscale des micro-entreprises à Madagascar," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4929, Paris Dauphine University.
- Anastasios Xepapadeas & Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos, . "On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents," DEOS Working Papers 1325, Athens University of Economics and Business.
- James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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