Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing
AbstractTax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 548.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5289
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
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TAXES; TAXATION; GAMES; GAME THEORY;
Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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- repec:ltr:wpaper:1995.18 is not listed on IDEAS
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