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Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing

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Author Info

  • Bardsley, P.

Abstract

Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 548.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:548

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Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
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Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
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Related research

Keywords: TAXES; TAXATION; GAMES; GAME THEORY;

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Cited by:
  1. repec:ltr:wpaper:1995.18 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Gautier, Jean-François, 2001. "L’informel est-il une forme de fraude fiscale ? Une analyse micro-économétrique de la fraude fiscale des micro-entreprises à Madagascar," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4929, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Chongwoo Choe, 1995. "Contract Design and Costly Verification Games," Working Papers 1995.18, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  4. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos, . "On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents," DEOS Working Papers 1325, Athens University of Economics and Business.
  5. Jean-François Gautier, 2000. "L’informel est-il une forme de fraude fiscale ? Une analyse microéconométrique de la fraude fiscale des micro-entreprises à Madagascar," Working Papers DT/2000/07, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
  6. Lipatov, Vilen, 2008. "Social Interaction in Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 8829, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Diagne, Youssoupha S & Thiaw, Kalidou, 2008. "Fiscalité et secteur informel au Sénégal
    [Informal sector and tax compliance in Senegal]
    ," MPRA Paper 54867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005.
  9. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Fryer, Roland, 2009. "Implicit Quotas," Scholarly Articles 2940155, Harvard University Department of Economics.

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