This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Corporate and Personal Income Tax Declarations

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Laszlo Goerke () (University of Tübingen, CESifo and IZA Bonn)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Decisions by firms and individuals on the extent of their tax payments have generally been treated as separate choices. Empirically, a positive relationship between corporate and personal income tax evasion can be observed. The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that a manager's decision on the firm's behaviour will be independent of his personal preferences if the gain from reducing corporate tax payments is certain, as in the case of tax avoidance. If, however, the firm evades taxes so that the manager's income depends on whether the firm's activities are detected or not, corporate and personal income tax evasion choices cannot be separated.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp2239.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2239.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2239

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information:
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Mark Fallak).

Related research
Keywords: firms; individuals; tax evasion; uncertainty;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alessandro Balestrino & Umberto Galmarini, 2003. "Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 37-52, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484.
  3. Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Cowell, F A, 1990. "Tax Sheltering and the Cost of Evasion," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 231-43, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Wrede, Matthias, 1995. "Tax Evasion and Risk Taking: Is Tax Evasion Desirable?," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 50(2), pages 303-16.
  6. Lee, Kangoh, 1995. "Risk Taking and Business Income Tax Evasion," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 50(1), pages 106-20.
  7. Kong-Pin Chen & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control vs. External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 151-164, Winter.
  8. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Baldry, Jonathan C, 1987. "Income Tax Evasion and the Tax Schedule: Some Experimental Results," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 42(3), pages 357-83.
  10. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2003. "Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence from the TCMP," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0306, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  11. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Landskroner, Yoram & Paroush, J & Swary, Itzhak, 1990. "Tax Evasion and Portfolio Decisions," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 45(3), pages 409-22.
  13. Marrelli, M. & Martina, R., 1988. "Tax evasion and strategic behaviour of the firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 55-69, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The yearly budget of IDEAS is exactly $0: it relies entirely on volunteer work.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.