Tax Compliance and Firms' Strategic Interdependence
AbstractWe focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax-compliance literature in economics, the behaviour of firms. We examine the impact of alternative audit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategic interdependence of firms. In the market firms may compete in terms of either output or price. The enforcement policy can have an effect on firms' behaviour in two dimensions - their market decisions as well as their compliance behaviour. An appropriate design of the enforcement policy can thus have a "double dividend" by manipulating firms in both dimensions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2006-09.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
tax compliance; evasion; oligopoly;
Other versions of this item:
- Bayer, Ralph & Cowell, Frank, 2009. "Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1131-1143, December.
- Ralph Bayer & Frank A Cowell, 2006. "Tax Compliance and Firms’ StrategicInterdependence," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 81, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2006-05-13 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2006-05-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-05-13 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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