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Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules

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Author Info
Alm, James
Cronshaw, Mark B
McKee, Michael

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Abstract

This paper uses experimental methods to examine the effectiveness of endogenous audit selection rules in which the audit probability depends upon taxpayer actions. The results indicate that endogenous rules are able to generate compliance far greater than random audit rules, even when the random audit rate is 50 percent. In particular, a cutoff rule is most effective in increasing compliance, although it requires a large number of audits, and regimes in which back or future audits depend on a taxpayer's current declarations also significantly increase compliance. The results thereby provide strong support for strategic selection of tax returns. Copyright 1993 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 46 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 27-45
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Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:46:y:1993:i:1:p:27-45

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  2. Ronald G. Cummings & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Michael McKee, 2001. "Cross Cultural Comparisions of Tax Compliance Behavior," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0103, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2009. "Local Autonomy, Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 243, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, 2006. "Rewarding Honest Taxpayers? Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-16, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Erich Kirchler & Stephan Muehlbacher & Barbara Kastlunger & Ingrid Wahl, 2007. "Why Pay Taxes? A Review of Tax Compliance Decisions," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0730, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Cadsby, C. B. & Song, Fei. & Tapon, F., . "Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat? An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 2008-10, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. C. Cadsby & Elizabeth Maynes & Viswanath Trivedi, 2006. "Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 343-359, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Giorgio Coricelli & Mateus Joffily & Claude Montmarquette & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-22, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Benno Torgler & Christoph A. Schaltegger & Markus Schaffner, 2003. "Is Forgiveness Divine? A Cross-Culture Comparison of Tax Amnesties," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 139(III), pages 375-396, September. [Downloadable!]
  10. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Compliance and Leverage in Auditing and Regulatory Enforcement," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 918, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, . "Steuermoral und Steuerhinterziehung," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  12. Mukhtar Ali & H. Cecil & James Knoblett, 2001. "The effects of tax rates and enforcement policies on taxpayer compliance: A study of self-employed taxpayers," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(2), pages 186-202, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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