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Tax Sheltering and the Cost of Evasion

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Author Info
Cowell, F A

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Abstract

The cost-of-evasion function is derived within a model of utility-maximizing taxpayers. The behavior of this cost in response to tax rates, enforcement paraters, income, and risk aversion is analyzed. The function is used to analyze the behavior of individuals in circumstances where there are opportunities for tax sheltering as well as tax evasion. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 42 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 231-43
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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:42:y:1990:i:1:p:231-43

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  1. Alessandro Balestrino, . "Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison Income Effect," EPRU Working Paper Series 05-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gideon Yaniv, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering, and Optimal Deterrence Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 27-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Chiarini, Bruno & Marzano, Elisabetta & Schneider, Friedrich, 2008. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: An Empirical Analysis of the Structural Aspects and Long-Run Characteristics in Italy," IZA Discussion Papers 3447, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Laszlo Goerke, 2006. "Corporate and Personal Income Tax Declarations," IZA Discussion Papers 2239, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Alessandro Balestrino & Umberto Galmarini, 2005. "On the Redistributive Properties of Presumptive Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ahmed, S., 2004. "Modelling corporate tax liabilities using company accounts: a new framework," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0412, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  7. Christian Traxler, 2009. "Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 43-58, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ralph C Bayer, 2004. "Finding out who the crooks are - Tax evasion with sequential auditing," Public Economics 0412009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Claude Montmarquette, 1997. "Are Underground Workers More Likely To Be Underground Consumers?," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-28, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 1996. "Punishment and Grace: on the Economics of Permanent Amnesties," Working Papers 252, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  12. Kalina Koleva, 2005. "A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05050, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  13. Ratbek Dzhumashev & Emin Gahramanov, 2009. "A Stochastic Growth Model with Income Tax Evasion: Implications for Australia," Economics Series 2009_05, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
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