IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp382.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Tax Evasion in a Unionised Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Goerke, Laszlo

    (IAAEU, University of Trier)

Abstract

In a unionised labour market, a substitution of a payroll for an income tax will not alter employment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, if workers or firms can evade taxes this irrelevance result might no longer apply. This will especially be the case if the fine for tax evasion depends on undeclared income or on wage payments or if withholding regulations prevent optimal evasion choices. In such instances, tax evasion opportunities make the legal incidence of taxes an important determinant of their economic incidence and employment can rise with a substitution of an income for a payroll tax.

Suggested Citation

  • Goerke, Laszlo, 2001. "Tax Evasion in a Unionised Economy," IZA Discussion Papers 382, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp382
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp382.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blinder, Alan S, 1988. "The Challenge of High Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1-15, May.
    2. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    3. Pierre Picard & Eric Toulemonde, 2001. "On the Equivalence of Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(4), pages 461-470, September.
    4. Gideon Yaniv, 1996. "Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: Note," Public Finance Review, , vol. 24(4), pages 501-505, October.
    5. Marrelli, M. & Martina, R., 1988. "Tax evasion and strategic behaviour of the firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 55-69, October.
    6. Paolo M. Panteghini, 2000. "Tax Evasion and Entrepreneurial Flexibility," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(3), pages 199-209, May.
    7. Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 1999. "Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 343-349, September.
    8. Yaniv, Gideon, 1995. "A Note on the Tax-Evading Firm," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 48(1), pages 113-120, March.
    9. Lai, Ching-Chong & Chang, Juin-Jen & Chang, Wen-Ya, 1995. "Tax Evasion and Efficient Bargains," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 50(1), pages 96-105.
    10. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Conant, John L., 1988. "Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 41(4), pages 579-581, December.
    11. Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August.
    12. Picard, Pierre M & Toulemonde, Eric, 2001. "On the Equivalence of Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(4), pages 461-470, September.
    13. Yaniv, Gideon, 1995. "A Note on the Tax-Evading Firm," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(1), pages 113-20, March.
    14. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Conant, John L., 1988. "Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(4), pages 579-81, December.
    15. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tomas Kögel, 2005. "On Substituting Consumption Taxes for Unemployment Insurance Contributions to Reduce Unemployment," Discussion Paper Series 2005_11, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Sep 2005.
    2. Marek Gora & Artur Radziwill & Agnieszka Sowa & Mateusz Walewski, 2006. "Tax Wedge and Skills: Case of Poland in International Perspective," CASE Network Reports 0064, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Laszlo Goerke, 2007. "Corporate and personal income tax declarations," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(3), pages 281-292, June.
    2. Laszlo Goerke & Marco Runkel, 2011. "Tax evasion and competition," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(5), pages 711-736, November.
    3. Paolo M. Panteghini, 2000. "Tax Evasion and Entrepreneurial Flexibility," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(3), pages 199-209, May.
    4. Cowell, Frank, 2003. "Sticks and carrots," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2046, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Laszlo Goerke, 2000. "The Wedge," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 68(5), pages 608-623, September.
    6. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2019. "Consumers as VAT “Evaders”: Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 21-67, April.
    7. Laszlo Goerke, 2008. "Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 177-196, May.
    8. Domenico Buccella & Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2023. "Tax evasion in a Cournot duopoly with unions," Discussion Papers 2023/293, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    9. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Tax Evasion and Tacit Collusion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(5), pages 633-657, September.
    10. Eichhorn, Christoph, 2006. "Optimal Policies in the Presence of Tax Evasion," Munich Dissertations in Economics 5586, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Besfamille, Martin & De Donder, Philippe & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2009. "The Political Economy of the (Weak) Enforcement of Sales Tax," CEPR Discussion Papers 7108, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Van der Linden, Bruno, 1998. "Fighting unemployment without worsening povety: Basic income versus reductions of social security contributions," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999028, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 00 Oct 1999.
    13. T. C. Michael Wu & C. C. Yang, 2011. "Monopolists' Profit Tax Evasion Revisited," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(6), pages 831-840, November.
    14. Riedl, Arno & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2005. "Tax liability side equivalence in gift-exchange labor markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2369-2382, December.
    15. Laszlo Goerke, 2012. "The Optimal Structure of Commodity Taxation in a Monopoly with Tax Avoidance or Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(4), pages 519-536, July.
    16. David Joulfaian, 2009. "Bribes and Business Tax Evasion," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 6(2), pages 227-244, December.
    17. Tomas Kögel, 2005. "On Substituting Consumption Taxes for Unemployment Insurance Contributions to Reduce Unemployment," Discussion Paper Series 2005_11, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Sep 2005.
    18. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2020. "Tax Evasion and Unions in a Cournot duopoly," Discussion Papers 2020/266, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    19. Laszlo Goerke, 2021. "Tax Evasion by Firms," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202104, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    20. Martin Weiss, 2009. "Higher Tax Rates on Labor? Evidence from German Panel Data," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(1), pages 73-92, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic incidence; legal incidence; penalty; tax evasion; trade union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp382. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Holger Hinte (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.