Tax Evasion in a Unionised Economy
AbstractIn a unionised labour market, a substitution of a payroll for an income tax will not alter employment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, if workers or firms can evade taxes this irrelevance result might no longer apply. This will especially be the case if the fine for tax evasion depends on undeclared income or on wage payments or if withholding regulations prevent optimal evasion choices. In such instances, tax evasion opportunities make the legal incidence of taxes an important determinant of their economic incidence and employment can rise with a substitution of an income for a payroll tax.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 382.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-11-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2001-11-05 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2001-11-05 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paolo M. Panteghini, 2000. "Tax Evasion and Entrepreneurial Flexibility," Public Finance Review, , , vol. 28(3), pages 199-209, May.
- Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996.
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
9610, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Wang, Leonard F.S. & Conant, John L., 1988. "Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(4), pages 579-81, December.
- Alan S. Blinder, 1988.
"The Challenge of High Unemployment,"
NBER Working Papers
2489, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Blinder, Alan S, 1988. "The Challenge of High Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1-15, May.
- Gideon Yaniv, 1996. "Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: Note," Public Finance Review, , , vol. 24(4), pages 501-505, October.
- Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August.
- Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 1999.
"Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 343-349, September.
- Koskela, E. & Schob, R., 1998. "Does the Composition of Wage and Payroll Taxes Matter Under Nash Bargaining," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics, Department of Economics 443, Department of Economics.
- Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schöb, 1999. "Does the Composition of Wage and Payroll Taxes Matter Under Nash Bargaining?," Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT) 203, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
- Lai, Ching-Chong & Chang, Juin-Jen & Chang, Wen-Ya, 1995. "Tax Evasion and Efficient Bargains," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , , vol. 50(1), pages 96-105.
- Picard, P.M. & Toulemonde, E., 1999.
"On the Equivalence of Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees,"
Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales
215, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
- Picard, Pierre M & Toulemonde, Eric, 2001. "On the Equivalence of Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(4), pages 461-70, September.
- Marrelli, M. & Martina, R., 1988. "Tax evasion and strategic behaviour of the firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 55-69, October.
- Marek Gora & Artur Radziwill & Agnieszka Sowa & Mateusz Walewski, 2006. "Tax Wedge and Skills: Case of Poland in International Perspective," CASE Network Reports, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research 0064, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
- Tomas Kögel, 2005. "On Substituting Consumption Taxes for Unemployment Insurance Contributions to Reduce Unemployment," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics, Loughborough University 2005_11, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Sep 2005.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.