On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime
AbstractIn this paper, the authors examine the economics of crime deterrence from an evolutionary perspective. A bimatrix game is used to model the interaction between populations of property owners and (potential) criminals, given exogenous levels of public policing and criminal sanctions. A crucial element in the authors' analysis is the private effort property owners exert to prevent theft. The dynamics show that the crime rate is cyclical over time and the average crime rate over the cycle is invariant to the magnitude of criminal sanctions. Furthermore, increased public policing raises the average crime rate until a threshold level of policing is reached where the crime rate falls.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (1998)
Issue (Month): 5 (November)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
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- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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