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Inspection games with long-run inspectors

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  • Luciano Andreozzi

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Abstract

A single, long-run policeman faces a large population of myopic would- be criminals. This paper shows that this interaction has counterintuitive comparative static properties. A forward-looking inspector might tolerate more law violations than a short-sighted one.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0821.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpde:0821

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  1. Neher, Philip A, 1978. "The Pure Theory of the Muggery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(3), pages 437-45, June.
  2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Saha, Atanu & Poole, Graham, 2000. "The economics of crime and punishment: An analysis of optimal penalty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 191-196, August.
  4. Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998. "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1101-1117, November.
  5. Franckx, Laurent, 2002. "The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-92, January.
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July.
  7. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
  8. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
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