Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games
AbstractWe generalise and extend the work of Inarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogeneous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version with complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 11/54.
Date of creation: Jan 2012
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Other versions of this item:
- Zuazo Garín, Peio & Rocha, André Barreira da Silva & Laruelle, Annick, 2011. "Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games," IKERLANAK 2011-57, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-ECM-2012-02-01 (Econometrics)
- NEP-ETS-2012-02-01 (Econometric Time Series)
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