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Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

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  • André Barreira da Silva Rocha

    ()

  • Annick Laruelle

    ()

  • Peio Zuazo

Abstract

We generalise and extend the work of Inarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogeneous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version with complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 11/54.

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Date of creation: Jan 2012
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Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:11/54

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  1. Iñarra García, María Elena & Laruelle, Annick, 2011. "Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination," IKERLANAK 2011-50, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  2. Platkowski, Tadeusz & Zakrzewski, Jan, 2011. "Asymptotically stable equilibrium and limit cycles in the Rock–Paper–Scissors game in a population of players with complex personalities," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(23), pages 4219-4226.
  3. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
  4. Xu, C. & Ji, M. & Yap, Yee Jiun & Zheng, Da-Fang & Hui, P.M., 2011. "Costly punishment and cooperation in the evolutionary snowdrift game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(9), pages 1607-1614.
  5. Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998. "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1101-1117, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Barreira da Silva Rocha, André, 2013. "Evolutionary dynamics of nationalism and migration," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(15), pages 3183-3197.
  2. André Barreira da Silva Rocha & Annick Laruelle, 2012. "Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/12, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Sep 2012.

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