Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination
AbstractWe introduce a new variation of the hawk-dove game suggested by an experiment that studies the behavior of a group of domestic fowls when a subgroup has been marked. Speci cally we consider a population formed by two types of individual that fail to recog- nize their own type but do recognize the other type. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies. In each of them, individuals from one type are always attacked more, whatever proportion of the population they represent. Our theoretical results are consistent with the conclusions drawn from experimental work, where marked fowls received more pecks than their unmarked counterparts.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 2011-50.
Date of creation: 08 Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2011-02-26 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-26 (Game Theory)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Zuazo Garín, Peio & Rocha, André Barreira da Silva & Laruelle, Annick, 2011.
"Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games,"
2011-57, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- André Barreira da Silva Rocha & Annick Laruelle & Peio Zuazo, 2012. "Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/54, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alcira Macías Redondo).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.