Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games
We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2011|
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|Order Information:|| Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain|
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- Iñarra García, María Elena & Laruelle, Annick, 2011. "Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination," IKERLANAK 2011-50, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
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