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Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

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  • André Barreira da Silva Rocha
  • Annick Laruelle

Abstract

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

Suggested Citation

  • André Barreira da Silva Rocha & Annick Laruelle, 2012. "Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/12, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Sep 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:12/12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
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    Keywords

    Cooperation; Snowdrift Game; Replicator Dynamics; Evolution; Similarity.;
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