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International Cooperation: Testing Evolution of Cooperation Theories

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  • Bowling Jeremy

    (The College of Wooster, 1189 Beall Avenue, Wooster, OH 44691, USA)

Abstract

The evolution of cooperation scholarship develops evolutionary stable theories that explain the presence of cooperation when there are many reasons to defect from cooperation. In this analysis, these theories are tested using the relations between states. Focusing on the direct reciprocity strategies of Tit-for-Tat and Win-stay/Lose-shift and the indirect reciprocity strategies of Cooperative Reputation and Tag, Tit-for-Tat and Cooperative Reputation are found to be robust, while Tags have mixed results. In the end, it is the direct cooperative action by states and their cooperative reputation and not shared characteristics that are most likely to elicit cooperative action in return.

Suggested Citation

  • Bowling Jeremy, 2017. "International Cooperation: Testing Evolution of Cooperation Theories," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 23(1), pages 1-35, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:23:y:2017:i:1:p:35:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2016-0020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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