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Equilibrium Resolution Mechanism for Multidimensional Conflicts in Farmland Expropriation Based on a Multistage Van Damme’s Model

Author

Listed:
  • Yang Tang

    (Department of Economy and Trade, School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Kairong Hong

    (Department of Economy and Trade, School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Yucheng Zou

    (Department of Economy and Trade, School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Yanwei Zhang

    (Department of Land Management, College of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China)

Abstract

Multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation originate from the game of multidimensional interests between the local government and farmers. The strategy choices and equilibrium results of the two sides have evolved with changes to the situation and policy adjustments. Focusing on different types of farmland expropriation conflicts, this paper constructs a multistage Van Damme’s model of multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation, analyzes the stable equilibrium point of the behavior evolution of the local government and farmers under litigation settlement and nonlitigation settlement, and conducts simulation analysis on the behavior evolution and conflict resolution of both sides at different stages through MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that (1) the interests’ game between the local government and farmers has changed periodically due to the evolution of the farmland expropriation system; (2) under litigation settlement, there is only the “government rent-seeking” conflict: in order to resolve the conflict, the cost of litigation for farmers can be reduced, while other policy interventions, such as controlling the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government and increasing the rent-seeking costs of the local government, can be implemented; (3) under nonlitigation settlement, there are three types of conflicts: to resolve the “government rent-seeking” conflict, we should control the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government and increase the rent-seeking costs of the local government or its positive social externality benefits under reasonable expropriation; to resolve the “nail household dilemma” conflict, we should increase the rent-seeking costs of farmers or their positive social externality benefits under reasonable compensation; to resolve the “extreme controversy” conflict, on the one hand, we should control the rent-seeking ceiling of farmers, and on the other hand, while controlling the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government, we should increase the farmers’ positive social externality benefits under reasonable compensation or negative social externality losses of both sides under rent seeking.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang Tang & Kairong Hong & Yucheng Zou & Yanwei Zhang, 2021. "Equilibrium Resolution Mechanism for Multidimensional Conflicts in Farmland Expropriation Based on a Multistage Van Damme’s Model," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-25, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:9:y:2021:i:11:p:1208-:d:562967
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Qiuxiang Li & Haijun Bao & Yi Peng & Haowen Wang & Xiaoling Zhang, 2017. "The Collective Strategies of Major Stakeholders in Land Expropriation: A Tripartite Game Analysis of Central Government, Local Governments, and Land-Lost Farmers," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-15, April.
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