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Multidimensional Fair Fuzzy Equilibrium Evaluation of Housing Expropriation Compensation from the Perspective of Behavioral Preference: A Case Study from China

Author

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  • Zhaoyu Cao

    (School of Public Administration, Hunan University of Finance and Economics, Changsha 410205, China
    School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Xu Zhao

    (School of Management, Hunan City University, Yiyang 413000, China)

  • Yucheng Zou

    (School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Kairong Hong

    (School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Yanwei Zhang

    (College of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China)

Abstract

With the rapid development of urbanization, substantial land areas and houses are expropriated, which can cause huge numbers of disputes related to expropriation compensation. The root of the disputes is that the associated subjects are affected by various behavioral preferences and make different cognitive fairness judgments based on the same compensation price. However, the existing expropriation compensation strategies based on the market value under the assumption of “the economic man” hypothesis cannot meet the fairness preference demands of the expropriated. Therefore, finding a compensation price that satisfies subjects’ multidimensional fairness preferences, including profit-seeking, loss aversion, and interactive fairness preferences, is necessary. Only in this way can the subjects reach an agreement regarding fair compensation and resolve their disputes. Because of the fuzziness of subjects’ expected revenues, this paper innovatively introduces trigonometric intuitional fuzzy numbers to construct one-dimensional and multidimensional fair fuzzy equilibrium evaluation models. The Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method is adopted to convert a multidimensional problem into a multiattribute group decision problem, which simplifies the problem of finding multidimensional equilibrium when considering the multidimensional fairness preferences of the two subjects. Real case data are introduced to verify the validity of this method. The research results show that upward revision of the multidimensional fairness preferences based on the market value assists in achieving a fair compensation agreement. Consideration of the influence of the subjects’ multidimensional fairness preferences on the fairness equilibrium is conducive to resolving the disputes, and provides a reference for the settlement of expropriation compensation disputes in developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhaoyu Cao & Xu Zhao & Yucheng Zou & Kairong Hong & Yanwei Zhang, 2021. "Multidimensional Fair Fuzzy Equilibrium Evaluation of Housing Expropriation Compensation from the Perspective of Behavioral Preference: A Case Study from China," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-22, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:9:y:2021:i:6:p:650-:d:519590
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    References listed on IDEAS

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