Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games
AbstractWe generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 2011-57.
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Other versions of this item:
- André Barreira da Silva Rocha & Annick Laruelle & Peio Zuazo, 2012. "Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/54, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-03-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EVO-2012-03-08 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-08 (Game Theory)
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