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Enforcement and price controls in emissions trading

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  • Stranlund, John K.
  • Moffitt, L. Joe
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    Abstract

    This paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms' abatement costs. The analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement-cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits. When this occurs, accommodating the effect of abatement-cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second-best optimal values. However, it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement-cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices. This enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort, the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs, and the policy produces the second-best optimal outcome.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

    Volume (Year): 67 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 20-38

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:67:y:2014:i:1:p:20-38

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

    Related research

    Keywords: Emissions trading; Emissions taxes; Cap-and-trade; Uncertainty; Price controls; Hybrid policies; Enforcement; Monitoring; Penalties; Prices vs. quantities;

    References

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