Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Watershed Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Johansson, Robert C.

Abstract

This study evaluates first- and second-best trading policies for regulating watershed phosphorus under asymmetric information. The trading policies are differentiated on the degree to which regulators observe point and nonpoint source abatement efforts. The efficiency losses attributable to these informational asymmetries and those of the second-best policies can be measured in social welfare, and provide regulators the shadow value of foregoing first-best measures. Given representative monitoring costs from national water monitoring programs, it is shown that under asymmetric information, the chosen second-best trading policies outperform first-best policies by 11% in the control of watershed nutrient pollution.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31382
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association in its journal Agricultural and Resource Economics Review.

Volume (Year): 31 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages:

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ags:arerjl:31382

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.narea.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Hansen, LeRoy T. & Feather, Peter & Shank, David, 1999. "Valuation Of Agriculture'S Multi-Site Environmental Impacts: An Application To Pheasant Hunting," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 28(2), October.
  2. Y.H. Farzin & J.D. Kaplan, 1999. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Under Incomplete and Costly Information," Working Papers 1999.32, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Loomis, John B., 1997. "Panel Estimators To Combine Revealed And Stated Preference Dichotomous Choice Data," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(02), December.
  4. Battese, George E., 1992. "Frontier production functions and technical efficiency: a survey of empirical applications in agricultural economics," Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 7(3-4), October.
  5. Heimlich, Ralph E. & Claassen, Roger, 1998. "Agricultural Conservation Policy At A Crossroads," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 27(1), April.
  6. Hellerstein, Daniel & Feather, Peter, 1997. "Calibrating Benefit Function Transfer to Assess the Conservation Reserve Program," MPRA Paper 25357, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Weitzman, Martin L, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 477-91, October.
  8. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September.
  9. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
  10. Moledina, Amyaz A. & Coggins, Jay S. & Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher, 2003. "Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: prices versus quantities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 356-376, March.
  11. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
  12. Coelli, Tim J., 1995. "Recent Developments In Frontier Modelling And Efficiency Measurement," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 39(03), December.
  13. Smith, Rodney B.W. & Tomasi, Theodore D., 1999. "Multiple Agents, And Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water Pollution Control Policies," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 28(1), April.
  14. Marc O. Ribaudo & C. Tim Osborn & Kazim Konyar, 1994. "Land Retirement as a Tool for Reducing Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 70(1), pages 77-87.
  15. Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
  16. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
  17. Battese, George E., 1992. "Frontier production functions and technical efficiency: a survey of empirical applications in agricultural economics," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 7(3-4), pages 185-208, October.
  18. Stavins Robert N., 1995. "Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-148, September.
  19. Yiridoe, Emmanuel K. & Weersink, Alfons, 1998. "Marginal Abatement Costs Of Reducing Groundwater-N Pollution With Intensive And Extensive Farm Management Choices," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 27(2), October.
  20. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
  21. van Egteren, Henry & Weber, Marian, 1996. "Marketable Permits, Market Power, and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 161-173, March.
  22. Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
  23. Horan, Richard D. & Shortle, James S. & Abler, David G., 1998. "Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 186-199, September.
  24. Mathews, Leah Greden & Homans, Frances R. & Easter, K. William, 1999. "Reducing Phosphorus Pollution In The Minnesota River: How Much Is It Worth?," Staff Papers 13771, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Claassen, Roger & Breneman, Vincent E. & Bucholtz, Shawn & Cattaneo, Andrea & Johansson, Robert C. & Morehart, Mitchell J., 2004. "Environmental Compliance In U.S. Agricultural Policy: Past Performance And Future Potential," Agricultural Economics Reports 34033, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
  2. Claassen, Roger & Cattaneo, Andrea & Johansson, Robert, 2008. "Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 737-752, May.
  3. Kaplan, Jonathan D. & Howitt, Richard E. & Farzin, Y. Hossein, 2003. "An information-theoretical analysis of budget-constrained nonpoint source pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 106-130, July.
  4. Ancev, Tihomir & Stoecker, Arthur L. & Storm, Daniel E. & White, Michael J., 2006. "The Economics of Efficient Phosphorus Abatement in a Watershed," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 31(03), December.
  5. Howitt, Richard E. & Kaplan, Jonathan D. & Johnson, Michael L. & Viers, Joshua H., 2004. "Managing Water Temperature Tmdls Under Economic And Environmental Uncertainty," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20182, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  6. Johansson, Robert C. & Gowda, Prasanna H. & Mulla, David J. & Dalzell, Brent J., 2004. "Metamodelling phosphorus best management practices for policy use: a frontier approach," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 63-74, January.
  7. Nguyen, Nga & Shortle, James S., 2006. "Transactions Costs and Point-Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Trading," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21096, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:arerjl:31382. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.