AbstractWe use cooperative game theory to analyze the strategic impact of three controversial pipeline projects. Two of them, Nord Stream and South Stream, allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream’s strategic value turns out to be huge, justifying the high investment cost for Germany and Russia. The additional leverage obtained through South Stream, in contrast, appears small. The third project, Nabucco, aims at diversifying Europe’s gas imports by accessing producers in Middle East and Central Asia. The project has a large potential to curtail Russia’s power, but the benefits accrue mainly to Turkey, while the gains for the EU are negligible.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by FIW in its series FIW Working Paper series with number 093.
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: FIW Project Office Austrian Institute of Economic Research Arsenal Objekt 20 A-1030 Vienna
Other versions of this item:
- Franz Hubert & Onur Cobanli, 2012. "Pipeline Power," KoÃ§ University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum 1224, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
- O22 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Project Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2012-05-29 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-ENE-2012-05-29 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-EUR-2012-05-29 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-29 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PPM-2012-05-29 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-TRA-2012-05-29 (Transition Economics)
- NEP-TRE-2012-05-29 (Transport Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Waft Grais & Kangbin Zheng, 1996. "Strategic Interdependence in European East-West Gas Trade: A Hierarchical Stackelberg Game Approach," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 61-84.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Game theory with pipelines
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-06-21 14:54:00
by himaginary in himaginaryの日記 on 2012-06-22 07:00:00
- Cobanli, Onur, 2014. "Central Asian gas in Eurasian power game," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 348-370.
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