Strategic Investment in International Gas-Transport Systems: A Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-up Problem
AbstractWe develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in a transnational pipeline system. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distort investment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in overinvestment in expensive and underinvestment in cheap pipelines. With repeated interaction, however, there is a potential to increase efficiency through dynamic collusion. In the theoretical part we establish a fundamental asymmetry: it is easier to avoid overinvestment than underinvestment. Calibrating the model to fit the Eurasian pipeline system for natural gas, we find that the potential to improve efficiency through dynamic cooperation is large. In reality, however, only modest improvements over the non-cooperative solution have been achieved.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 846.
Length: 31 p.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Multilateral bargaining; Hold-up; irreversible investment; collusion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2009-01-17 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-17 (Game Theory)
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- Le Coq, Chloe & Paltseva, Elena, 2012. "The EU-Russia Gas Relationship: a mutual dependency," SITE Working Paper Series 18, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
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