The dynamics of closeness and betweenness
AbstractAlthough both betweenness and closeness centrality are claimed to be important for the effectiveness of someones network position, it has not been explicitly studied which networks emerge if actors follow incentives for these two positional advantages. We propose such a model and observe that network dynamics differ considerably in a scenario with either betweenness or closeness incentives compared to a scenario in which closeness and betweenness incentives are combined. Considering social consequences, we find low clustering when actors strive for either type of centrality. Surprisingly, actors striving for closeness are likely to reach networks with relatively low closeness and high betweenness, while this is the other way round for actors striving for betweenness. This shows that in both situations the network formation process implies a social dilemma in which the social optimum is not reached by individual optimizing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 398.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2008
Date of revision:
networks; closeness centrality; betweenness centrality; actor utility; network dynamics; social dilemma;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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