Confirming information flows in networks
AbstractSocial networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. We consider networks where agents have an incentive to confirm the information they receive from others. Our paper analyzes the social networks that are formed. We first study the existence of Nash equilibria and then characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Next, we characterize the set of strictly efficient networks and discuss the relationship between strictly efficient networks and strict Nash networks. Finally, we check the robustness of our results by allowing for heterogeneity among agents, possibility of bilateral deviations of agents, and decay in network.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 2013-06.
Date of creation: 2013
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R&D COLLABORATION; NETWORK FORMATION; MULTI-MARKET OLIGOPOLIES;
Other versions of this item:
- Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Jurjen Kamphorst & Sudipta Sarangi, 2012. "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-019/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2013. "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," MPRA Paper 45835, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sudipta Sarangi & Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Jurjen Kamphorst, . "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2012-02, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2013-07-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-INO-2013-07-15 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2013-07-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2013-07-15 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-07-15 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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