Resources Flows Asymmetries in Strict Nash Networks with Partner Heterogeneity
AbstractThis paper introduces a partner heterogeneity assumption in the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000, ). Our goal consists in the characterization of strict Nash networks with regard to the set of resources obtained by players. We use the notion of condensation network which allows us to divide the population in sets of players who obtain the same resources and we order these sets according to the resources obtained. Accordingly, we can examine the relationship between heterogeneity and asymmetries in networks. We establish that the nature of heterogeneity plays a crucial role on asymmetries observed in equilibrium networks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 1108.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Nash networks; one-way flow model; condensation networks; chain; inf-semi-lattice;
Other versions of this item:
- Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Resources Flows Asymmetries in Strict Nash Networks with Partner Heterogeneity," Post-Print halshs-00574256, HAL.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
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- Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006.
"Network formation with heterogeneous players,"
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- Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2002. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-069/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Jurjen Kamphorst, 2003. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Economics Discussion Papers 562, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Michael McBride, 2003.
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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- Andrea Galeotti, 2006.
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Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 163-179, September.
- Haller, Hans & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2005. "Nash networks with heterogeneous links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 181-201, September.
- Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Strict Nash networks and partner heterogeneity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 515-525, August.
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