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Existence of Nash Networks in One-Way Flow Models

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  • Pascal Billand
  • Christophe Bravard
  • Sudipta Sarangi

Abstract

This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way flow or directed network models in a number of different settings. In these models players form costly links with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting them. We find that heterogeneity in the costs of establishing links play a crucial role in the existence of Nash networks. We also provide conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous.

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File URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.77524.de/dp751.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 751.

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Length: 28 p.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp751

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Keywords: Network Formation; Non-cooperative Games;

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References

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  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
  2. Haller, Hans & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2005. "Nash networks with heterogeneous links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 181-201, September.
  3. Sudipta Sarangi & Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard, . "Heterogeneity in Nash Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2006-18, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
  4. Andrea Galeotti, 2006. "One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 163-179, September.
  5. Hans Haller & Sudipta Sarangi, 2003. "Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 337, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  6. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Jurjen Kamphorst, 2003. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Economics Discussion Papers 562, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  7. Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe, 2005. "A note on the characterization of Nash networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 355-365, May.
  8. Billand, P. & Bravard, C., 2004. "Non-cooperative networks in oligopolies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 593-609, May.
  9. Hans Haller & Jurjen Kamphorst & Sudipta Sarangi, 2007. "(Non-)existence and Scope of Nash Networks," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 597-604, June.
  10. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
  11. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity," Working Papers 1111, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  2. Haller, Hans, 2012. "Network extension," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 166-172.
  3. Sumit Joshi & Poorvi Vora, 2013. "Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 657-696, August.
  4. Olaizola Ortega, María Norma & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2012. "Asymmetric flow networks," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-60, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  5. Jean Derks & Martijn Tennekes, 2009. "A note on the existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 515-522, December.
  6. Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi & Pascal Billand, 2008. "A Note on Existence of Nash Networks in One-way Flow," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(79), pages 1-4.
  7. Breitmoser, Yves & Vorjohann, Pauline, 2012. "Efficient structure of noisy communication networks," MPRA Paper 42862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Cui, Zhiwei & Wang, Shouyang & Zhang, Jin & Zu, Lei, 2013. "Stochastic stability in one-way flow networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 410-421.

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