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Dynamic network formation with incomplete information

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  • Yangbo Song
  • Mihaela Schaar

Abstract

How do networks form and what is their ultimate topology? Most of the literature that addresses these questions assumes complete information: agents know in advance the value of linking even with agents they have never met and with whom they have had no previous interaction (direct or indirect). This paper addresses the same questions under the much more natural assumption of incomplete information: agents do not know in advance—but must learn—the value of linking. We show that incomplete information has profound implications for the formation process and the ultimate topology. Under complete information, the network topologies that form and are stable typically consist of agents of relatively high value only. Under incomplete information, a much wider collection of network topologies can emerge and be stable. Moreover, even with the same topology, the locations of agents can be very different: An agent can achieve a central position purely as the result of chance rather than as the result of merit. All of this can occur even in settings where agents eventually learn everything so that information, although initially incomplete, eventually becomes complete. The ultimate network topology depends significantly on the formation history, which is natural and true in practice, and incomplete information makes this phenomenon more prevalent. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Yangbo Song & Mihaela Schaar, 2015. "Dynamic network formation with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(2), pages 301-331, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:59:y:2015:i:2:p:301-331
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0858-y
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Simpson Zhang & Mihaela van der Schaar, 2018. "Reputational Dynamics in Financial Networks During a Crisis," Working Papers 18-03, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    2. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2019. "Stability of networks under horizon-K farsightedness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 177-201, July.
    3. Chenghong Luo & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2021. "Network formation with myopic and farsighted players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1283-1317, June.
    4. Hazem KRICHENE & ARATA Yoshiyuki & Abhijit CHAKRABORTY & FUJIWARA Yoshi & INOUE Hiroyasu, 2018. "How Firms Choose their Partners in the Japanese Supplier-Customer Network? An application of the exponential random graph model," Discussion papers 18011, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    5. Shadi Mohagheghi & Jingying Ma & Francesco Bullo, 2020. "Stable and Efficient Structures in Multigroup Network Formation," Papers 2001.10627, arXiv.org.
    6. Safi, Shahir, 2022. "Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 230-247.
    7. Yangbo Song & Mihaela Schaar, 2020. "Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 345-384, June.
    8. Promit K. Chaudhuri & Sudipta Sarangi & Hector Tzavellas, 2023. "Games Under Network Uncertainty," Papers 2305.03124, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    9. Yang Xu, 2017. "Intervention On Default Contagion Under Partial Information," Papers 1710.02127, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network formation; Incomplete information; Dynamic network formation; Link formation; Formation history; Externalities; A14; C72; D62; D83; D85;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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