Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kirchsteiger, Georg
  • Mantovani, Marco
  • Mauleon, Ana
  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

Abstract

Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP8263.asp
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8263.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8263

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: experiment; myopic and farsighted stability; Network formation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Gilles Grandjean & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2011. "Connections Among Farsighted Agents," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(6), pages 935-955, December.
  2. Jean-Jacques, HERINGS & Ana, MAULEON & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2006. "Farsightedly stable networks," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006046, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  3. Engelmann,Dirk & Strobel,Martin, 2002. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," Research Memorandum 015, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
  4. Page Jr. Frank H & Wooders, Myrna & Kamat, Samir, 2003. "Networks and Farsighted Stability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 689, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Bhaskar Dutta & Sayantan Ghosal & Debraj Ray, 2004. "Farsighted Network Formation," Working papers 122, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
  7. Jackson, Matthew O., 1998. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Working Papers 1044, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  8. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
  9. Armin Falk, Michael Kosfeld, . "It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation," IEW - Working Papers 146, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  10. Olivier Tercieux & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2006. "A characterization of stochastically stable networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 351-369, October.
  11. Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2007. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Caepr Working Papers 2007-020, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  12. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  13. Kosfeld Michael, 2004. "Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, March.
  14. Watts, Alison, 2002. "Non-myopic formation of circle networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 277-282, January.
  15. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2003. "Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior," Working Papers 52, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  16. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
  17. Aljaž Ule & Jacob K. Goeree & Arno Riedl, 2007. "In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers 2007.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  18. Jean-Jacques HERINGS & Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2001. "Rationalizability for Social Environments," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001028, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  19. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2004. "Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 291-324, 05.
  20. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Katinka Pantz, 2005. "Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  21. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  22. Watts, Alison, 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Boncinelli, Leonardo & Pin, Paolo, 2014. "Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation," MPRA Paper 56356, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Egbert, Henrik & Sedlarski, Teodor, 2011. "Exploring Impact: Negative Effects of Social Networks," MPRA Paper 56688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. B. Hoyer, 2013. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
  4. Charness, Gary & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. & Sutter, Matthias, 2012. "Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games on Networks," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt51v6w9hd, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8263. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.